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iolent acts motivated by prejudice against persons
and groups due to race, ethnicity, religion, national
origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or
age, commonly known as "hate crimes,"' are the "embodiment of
Professor of Legal Writing, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law. B.A. 1977, J.D. 1984, Northern Kentucky University. In addition
to Basic Legal Skills, Professor Jolly-Ryan teaches Discrimination Law and is a
Commissioner on the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. The opinions
expressed in this Article are the author's and not necessarily those of the Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights. Thanks to ProfessorMartin J. Huelsmann, member,
Kentucky Criminal Justice Council; Beverly Watts, Executive Director, Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights; the members of the Kentucky Commission on
Human Rights; Rachel Leleune; and Jennifer Edwards.
I See Terry A. Maroney, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a
Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564 (1998). The groups protected varies greatly
from state to state. The definition may include threats, intimidation, harassment, or
attacks on property motivated by such bias, as well as acts in which the victim is
not actually a member of the targeted group, but is perceived as such. See id. at 564
n.3. See also Erika L. On', The Hate Crimes Act: Broadening the Scope of
Culpability, 85 ILL. B.J. 564 (1997); In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (Ill. 1997).
Pure "hate speech," unaccompanied by an actual or implied threat of violence,
while thought to promote violent hate crimes, does not come within the definition
and raises significant First Amendment concerns which have been the subject of
many other books and law review articles. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN &
ERIC M. FREEDMAN, GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND VIOLENCE (1995); LAuRA LEDERER &
RICHARD DELGADO, THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH,
HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (1995); Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim 's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320
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intolerance."2
Hate crimes ... leave deep scars not only on the victims, but on our larger
community. They weaken the sense that we are one people with common
values and a common future. They tear us apart when we should be
moving closer together. They are acts of violence against America itself.
3
In 1998, the Kentucky Legislature began to heal the scars imposed by
hate crimes, scars that have left both individuals and communities
victimized, by enacting the Commonwealth's first hate crime statute.4 In
(1989). The Hate Crimes PreventionAct of 1997 defines a "hate crime" as "a crime
in which the defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property
crime, the property that is the object of the crime, because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or
sexual orientation of any person." H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. (1997).
2 Kristine Olson, The Government and the Community: A Coordinated Res-
ponse to Hate Crime in America, 45 FED. LAW. 47 (1998).
3 Id. (quoting President Clinton, Radio Address on Hate Crime (June 7, 1997)).
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 [hereinafter K.R.S.] (Michie 1990 & Supp.
1998) (effective July 15, 1998) provides:
(1) A person may be found by the sentencing judge to have committed
an offense specified below as a result of a hate crime if the person
intentionally because of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, or national
origin of another individual or group of individuals violates a provision of
any one (1) of the following:
(a) KRS 508.010, 508.020, or 508.025;
(b) KRS 508.050 or 508.060;




(f) KRS 512.020, 512.050, or 512.060;
(g) KRS 513.020, 513.030, or 513.040; or
(h) KRS 525.020, 525.050, 525.060, 525.070, or 525.080.
(2) At sentencing, the sentencing judge shall determine if, by a
preponderance of the evidence presented at the trial a hate crime was a
primary factor in the commission of the crime by the defendant. If so, the
judge shall make a written finding of fact and enter that in the court record
and in the judgment rendered against the defendant.
(3) The finding that a hate crime was a primary factor in the commission
of the crime by the defendant may be utilized by the sentencing judge as the
sole factor for denial of probation, shock probation, conditional discharge,
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doing so, the Kentucky Legislature has made clear that it intends to take a
stand against the violence resulting from hate and intolerance. By taking
this first step, the Legislature has left itself open to future opportunities to
strengthen the law in a very reasonable fashion. Those central to its
enactment and enforcement acknowledge that the 1998 version of
Kentucky's Hate Crimes Act is simply a starting place for more
comprehensive legislation after further study.' The purpose of this Article
is to hopefully aid in that study and to urge the adoption of stronger hate
crime laws in Kentucky during the next legislative session. Other state
legislatures undergoing revision or adoption of hate crime laws may also
benefit from Kentucky's experience and the analysis contained in this
Article.
Recognizing that the Kentucky Legislature has taken the first of
multiple steps in adopting effective hate crime laws, this Article focuses
upon the most problematic facet of the current statute: the absence of any
specific penalty enhancement for hate crimes. There are many other issues
which should be addressed by the Kentucky Legislature, but they are
beyond the scope of this Article.6
This Article briefly reviews the history of the 1998 Kentucky Hate
Crimes Act's adoption and its essential provisions. I will contend that
although Kentucky has taken the necessary first step, hate crime laws in
Kentucky need to be strengthened if they are to be effective. Specific
penalty enhancement provisions must be incorporated within the Hate
Crimes Act and must replace the purely discretionary sentence
enhancements it now contains. The addition ofpenalty enhancement would
or other form of nonimposition of a sentence of incarceration.
(4) The finding by the sentencing judge that a hate crime was a primary
factor in the commission of the crime by the defendant may be utilized by
the Parole Board in delaying or denying parole to a defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
6For example, gender, age, and disability are not included as protected classes
under the statute. See K.R.S. § 532.031(1) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998). If specific
penalty enhancements are adopted, the Kentucky Legislature will need to address
the categories of crimes for which a penalty can be enhanced and at what stage of
the proceedings evidence of hate motivation is introduced. The Legislature will
also need to determine whether the judge or jury should hear evidence concerning
motivation. The jury could determine the motivation of the defendant, just as it
does in discrimination cases under Title VII (which makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an employee "because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
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make Kentucky's hate crime laws consistent with the Anti-Defamation
League ("ADL") Model Law, as well as with the forty other states with
penalty enhancement provisions in their hate crime laws. By providing for
specific penalty enhancements, the legislature will strengthen Kentucky's
hate crime laws and thereby deter their commission while also addressing
injuries to the community at large. It will also provide necessary notice to
a person charged with a hate crime that the sentence will be enhanced if the
requisite motivation is proved at trial.
II. KENTUCKY HATE CRIME STATISTICS AND REPORTS
Nationwide and in Kentucky, hate crimes either are on the rise or have
been reported more efficiently in recent years. In 1996, "[1]aw enforcement
agencies across the country reported 5396 hate crimes based on race, 1401
based on religion, 1016 on sexual orientation, [and] 940 on ethnic
background."7 At a time when violent crime in general is declining, the
number of reported hate crimes is increasing. "The number of reported hate
crimes [in the United States in 1996] was up 9.2 percent from 1995 and
33.2 percent from 1994."8 Many people have noted that the number of hate
crimes actually committed may be much higher as, historically, the FBI has
not compared hate crime statistics from year to year and local law
enforcement agencies in most states have not been required to collect or
report hate crime statistics. Moreover, many believe that the number of
hate crimes actually committed may be much higher than the official
statistics would indicate, as many crimes which could be classified as hate
crimes go unreported to local authorities.9
In Kentucky, the number of hate crimes reported in the past is
somewhat unreliable.' It appears that many of these problems have been
resolved, as the state police have created new forms and reporting
procedures. Whether it is because of better reporting mechanisms or an
increase in reported hate crimes that always have existed in Kentucky, one
thing is clear: the number of hate crimes reported in Kentucky is on the
7 Reno Endorses Hate-Crime Bill; Law Would Get More Categories, CIN-
CINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al8.
8FBIReports 8,759 Hate Crimes in 1996, RACE REL. REP., Mar. 15, 1998, at
1.
9 See id. The FBI issues its report on hate crimes in four-year cycles. The most
current report was issued in 1996.
" See Michael Quinlan, Hate-Crime Data from Kentucky Didn't Reach FBI,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 20, 1996, at Al.
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rise." In any event, the raw numbers cannot tell the stories of fear and
intimidation forever living in the hearts and minds of the victims. Examples
of hate crimes in Kentucky have been well-publicized. The stories behind
the raw statistics show the need for effective hate crime legislation in
Kentucky.
- A family's new home near Louisville, Kentucky was destroyed by
fire and a firefighter was killed. Investigators believed that there was a
racial motive for the arson because the owners of the home were white
foster parents of two African-American children. Shortly after the fire,
investigators found a statuette of a small African-American boy holding a
fishing rod, swinging from a tree with a clothesline around its neck. One
week prior to the fire, police officers had staked out the house looking for
a dark pick-up truck. The driver and passengers were white and had been
yelling racial slurs at the family. 2
- On the Fourth of July holiday, a Kentucky couple found a cross
burning on their front lawn. 3
0 A nineteen-year-old Korean woman was threatened and told to leave
the country while being called a "Jap" and "Puerto Rican." Her harasser
was a teenage boy who pulled up beside her on a Lexington, Kentucky
street. The boy followed her for five minutes in his car and nearly hit her
when he stopped his car and threw it into reverse. 4
* A black family living in Western Kentucky found hate letters
scattered across their lawn. Two weeks before, four black Paducah police
officers received hate letters in the mail. 5
0 Christian students were shot and killed at their high school in
Paducah, Kentucky while attending a prayer group. Observers reportedthat
the boy who fired the shots had taunted and ridiculed the students for
praying openly. 6
" From 1995 to 1996, reported hate crimes increased in Kentucky from 81 to
109. See Reno Endorses Hate-Crime Bill, supra note 7, at Al8.
,2 Nikita Stewart, New Home ofFamily Burned Out is Searched; Fire Still Seen
as Hate Crime, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept 17, 1994, at A7.
'" See Infrequent Hate-Crime Reports Linked to Fear orRetaliation, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 16, 1995, at B4.
'4 See id.
" See Family Determined to Stay Despite Hate Letters; But Kentuckians to Be
More Cautious, EVANSVILLE COURIER, Sept. 22, 1997, at A8 (explaining that the
letters did not constitute a hate crime because Kentucky had no hate crime law and
no federal law was violated because the letters contained no threats).
16 See Editorial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 1997, at A36. It was not
widely discussed in the media whether this crime was motivated by anti-religious
1999-2000]
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- A young black man was shot on the streets of Covington, Kentucky.
Police reported that the suspected assailant was white and that before firing
the shot shouted, "I'm going to kill you, monkey nigger."'7 FBI officials
investigated the case against the white male, but did not prosecute under
federal hate crime law because the incident "failed to meet the stringent
criteria.' 8 There were no hate crime laws on the books in Kentucky in
1997 and the man stood charged only of assault. 19
- A cross made of two broom handles was placed on the front lawn of
a black man's home in Covington, Kentucky and set on fire. A pointed
cardboard hat with a white sheet draped over it, swastikas, and sheets with
the letters "KKK" painted on them were found at the scene. 0
• A black man was hit on the head with a beer bottle while sitting in his
car in the parking lot of a pizzeria in Kentucky. His attackers were two
white men who repeatedly slammed him into the frame of his car when he
tried to get away. The attackers were heard to say to the victim, "Get the
f*** out of here, you f***ing ngger," and "F*** Martin Luther King."'"
• A black family who had moved into an all-white neighborhood in
Western Kentucky immediately began to hear racial slurs yelled from cars
passing their home at night, and dozens of racist fliers were thrown into
their yard. The fliers claimed that by being African-American, the family
had lowered property values. Signed by a group calling itself "Last Rites,"
the hate fliers suggested that the family return to Africa, gave them thirty
days to leave the neighborhood, and threatened, "Not even the police can
protect you." Mr. Oliver, who occupied the home with his family,
revealed the unique injury caused by hate crimes as he addressed the
sentencing judge:
bias, which could be classified as a hate crime. One writer suggested that the boy
who fired the shots had been left out and harassed by the Christian students. Id. See
also Letters, DETROIT NEWs, Dec. 24, 1997, at A6.
7 Frank Main, Shooting May Be Hate Crime, Says Covington Cops, CIN-
CINNATI POST, May 29, 1997, at A20.
18 See Jane Prendergast, Hate-Crime Law Sought for State, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, June 15, 1997, at Al.
1 See id.
20 Cross Burning, RACE REL. REP., Jan. 15, 1998, at 2 (citing the KY. POST
(Covington, Ky.), Nov. 4, 1997).
21 Hate Crime Violence, RACE REL. REP., May 15, 1999, at 2 (citing the
ASHLAND INDEPENDENT, Feb. 27, 1999 (expletives deleted)).
' James Malone, 3 Men Sentenced to Prison for Harassing Black Family,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 10, 1998, at B3.
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Your honor, I have four kids; my baby doesn't want to go to bed and
sleep (alone), and one daughter is in therapy. My wife has post-traumatic
stress. When we moved on (Ky.) 94, all we wanted was the God-given
right as Americans to buy a house. I wish I'd never bought it... We
would ask for you to send a message to Calloway County, to Western
Kentucky and to Bill Clinton's doorstep that all hate crimes will be
punished to the full extent of the law. 3
Hate crimes do much more than injure their direct victims, and the
damage done cannot be measured solely in terms of physical injury or
dollars and cents. Other members of the victim's community often feel
intimidated, isolated, vulnerable, and unprotected by the law. "By making
members of minority communities fearful, angry and suspicious of other
groups-of the power structure that is supposed to protect them-[hate
crimes] can damage the fabric of our society and fragment communities."24
H. 1998 KENTUCKY HATE CRIMES ACT
-AN OVERVIEW
A. History ofAdoption of the 1998 Kentucky Hate Crimes Act
In response to the escalating numbers of hate crimes reported and
the unique injury suffered by the victims and community at large, most
states have adopted some form of hate crime legislation' In the absence
of meaningful criminal penalties for their commission, hate crimes
essentially go unaddressed. Until 1998, Kentucky was one of a handful of
states that did not have hate crime legislation. Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Wyoming remain among those
states.26 In 1998, the Hate Crimes Act was enacted by the Kentucky
Legislature.
23 Id.
24 Anti-Defamation League, 1999 Hate Crimes Laws (visited Aug. 5, 1999)
<http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/intro.html>.
2s See id. at <http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/Penalty.html>. As of January
1999, only nine states were without hate crime laws. See Four Anti-Bias Bills in
WyomingExpected in Wake of Gay Student's Death, CIVILRIGHTS (State Capitals
News-letters, Alexandria, Va.), Jan. 18, 1999, at 2.
26 See Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, 1999
Hate Crimes Laws (visited Sept. 26, 1999) <http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/
provisions.html> [hereinafter ADL Statutory Provisions].
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During its 1998 Session, the Kentucky Legislature revisited the issue
of whether to adopt a hate crime bill.27 The Kentucky Legislature reintro-
duced proposed hate crime legislation on January 15, 1998.2 As originally
proposed, the legislation was designed to create the new crime of "ethnic
intimidation" 9 and, if adopted, would have specifically enhanced penalties
for certain criminal offenses by one degree if race was a factor in the
commission of the offense.3° The proposed bill would also have created the
new crime of "institutional vandalism," 3' and would have allowed victims
of institutional vandalism and ethnic intimidation to collect compensatory
and punitive damages in a civil trial.32 Moreover, a victim of ethnic
intimidation would have been eligible for crime victim compensation.33
This initial House bill, with specific penalties for the commission of hate
crimes, was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, where it
remained.34 A second House bill, introduced on January29, 1998, met with
27A hate crime bill designed to combat crimes motivated by race, religion, or
ethnicity was introduced during the 1996 legislative session. The bill failed to
garner the support of the Kentucky Senate. See Patton, Chandler Back Stiff
Penalties for Crimes, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 20, 1996, at
A10 [hereinafter Patton]. The Kentucky Commission on Human Rights has
initiated hate crime legislation in the last two biennial legislative sessions. The
Commission has consistently endorsed the principle of enhanced penalties for hate
crimes and has been working with the newly created Kentucky Criminal Justice
Council on year 2000 hate crime legislation. See infra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text.
' See House Bill 298, available on LegislativeResearch Commission Webpage
(visitedMar. 12,1998) <http://www.lre.state.ky.us.record/98rs/HB298.htm> (spon-
sored by Representatives P. Hatcher, Jr. and J. Crenshaw). See also House Bill 455,
available on Legislative Research Commission Webpage (visited Sept. 30, 1999)
<http://www.lrc.state.ky.us.record/98rs/HB455.htm>.29 H.R. 298, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998).
30 New sections of Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapters 532 and 525 would
have been created to encompass these crimes. See id.
" Id. The House Bill would have created a new section of Kentucky Revised
Statutes Chapter 525 and made institutional vandalism a Class D felony.
32 See id. A new section of Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 431 would have
been created.33 See id. A new section of Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 346, relating to
crime victim compensation, would have been created.
" House Bill 298 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on January 16,
1998, but no further action is recorded by the Legislative Research Commission.
See House Bill 298, available on Legislative Research Commission Webpage
(visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://www.lrc.state.ky.us.record/98rs/HB298.htm>
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greater success. Entitled "An Act Relating to Criminal Justice Matters,"
House Bill 455 simply proposed to "prohibit ethnic intimidation," '35 and
listed fourteen other reforms to Kentucky's.criminal justice system.36
House Bill 455 was sponsored by twenty-five Kentucky legislators.3 7
Unlike earlier versions of hate crime legislation in Kentucky, House Bill
455 received the enthusiastic and unwavering support of both Governor
Paul Patton and Attorney General Ben Chandler." The 1998 hate crime
legislation originated as part of Governor Patton's expansive proposal to
reform the state's criminal justice system.3 9
Governor Patton's proposed crime package was spurred by the burning
of an African-American church in Kentucky by suspected racist arsonists.
In 1996, a church in Providence, Kentucky, with a predominantly African-
American congregation, was burned to the ground at the hands of arsonists.
Prior to the Kentucky church fire, forty-two predominantly African-
American churches in nine southern states had been burned by arsonists.'
(sponsored by Representatives P. Hatcher, Jr. and J. Crenshaw).
11 House Bill 455, available on Legislative Research Commission Webpage
(visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.lre.state.ky.us.record/98rs/HB455.htm>.36 See id.
31 See H.R. 455, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998). The sponsors of House Bill 455 were:
M. Bowling, R. Adkins, K. Bratcher, J. Bruce, J. Callahan, L. Clark, D. Ford, C.
Geveden, J. Gooch, J. Haydon, S. Johns, J. Lee, J. Lovell, H. Moberly, R.
Murgatroyd, S. Nunn, T. Pope, J. Richards, S. Riggs, A. Simpson, J. Stacy, G.
Stumbo, T. Turner, M. Weaver, and B. Yonts.
31 See Patton, supra note 27, at A10.39 See Robert T. Garrett, Patton, Keep ViolentFelons JailedLonger-Plan Also
Boosts Victims' Services, Police Standards, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),
Jan. 17. 1998, at B1. Unlike the House Bill introduced in 1996, the 1998 Hate
Crime Bill did not suffer any direct competition from other controversial civil
rights issues confronting the Kentucky legislature. During the 1996 legislative
session, Representative Porter Hatcher, Jr. unsuccessfully introduced a house bill
about hate crimes. It passed House scrutiny, but failed to gain the support of the
Senate. See Patton, supra note 27, at A10. The 1996 Hate Crime Bill was in
competition with a proposed Racial Justice Act. Many people believed that the
Racial Justice Act, if adopted, would complicate appeals in death sentence cases.
The Kentucky Legislature did enact a Racial Justice Act in 1998, which prohibits
the imposition of a death sentence in criminal cases based upon race. See K.R.S.
§§ 532.300 - .309 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998).
4 Tom Loftus, Kentucky's Church-Arson Response Group Has First Test,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 24, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Loftus,
Kentucky's Church-Arson Response Group]. In 1996, the nation's attention was
focused upon violence motivated by racism, as approximately 67 churches with
black congregations had been burned in 1995 and 1996. See Fox Butterfield, Old
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Two other churches in Louisville, Kentucky, with predominantly African-
American congregations, were burned in the 1990s: Apostolic Faith
Assembly Church and Asbury Chapel AME Church.4' The federal
government was criticized by some civil rights activists and clergy
members in Kentucky for moving too slowly to apprehend the individuals
responsible for the burning of African-American churches throughout the
South.42
In 1996, clergy and high ranking officials from several southern states
attended a White House meeting to address the recent church fires
throughout the South.43 Governor Patton and Attorney General Chandler
attended the White House meeting and vowed to support legislation in the
Fears and New Hope: Tale ofBurned Black Church Goes Far BeyondArson, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1996, at A12. Subsequent investigations of the fires and over 100
arrests led federal officials to the conclusion that racial hatred was but one of
several factors motivating the church arsonists. Two Ku Klux Klansmen were
prosecuted and pled guilty to conspiracy charges in connection with the burning of
two South Carolina churches. But black men were also charged with the burning
of black churches. One-third of the people arrested in the burnings were black.
Forty-one percent (41%) of the churches burned were attended by predominately
black congregations and the rest were predominantly white. Forty-four percent
(44%) of the fires were started by juveniles. See Pierre Thomas, Blacks Are a
Sizeable Minority in Church Arsons, Records Show, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 15, 1996, at A2. In Kentucky, out of the 18 churches that
were burned, two were attended by a predominantly black congregation. See
Cynthia Eagles, 16 of18 Churches Hit by Arsonists Were White; Race Not Viewed
as Factor in Fires at 2 Black Churches, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Jan.
15, 1997, at B4.
" See Louis Coleman, Forum, Lax Church-BurnerPursuit, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), June.30, 1996, at D3.42 See id. As director of The Justice Resource Center in Louisville, Kentucky,
Coleman wrote:
I, along with other ministers, feel these church burnings are not accidental
but a symbol of hatred toward people of color. It's amazing how the Justice
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation can prioritize other
concerns and the burning of churches, cross burings and Klan activities are
very seldom remedied.
Id. In focusing upon hate activities in the state of Kentucky, Coleman reported that
"[i]t is not unusual for citizens in the Commonwealth of Kentucky to wake up and
read headlines addressing Klan activities, cross burnings, and other hate activities.
The perpetrators are very seldom caught. The same seems true not only locally, but
throughout the nation." Id.
43See Patton, supra note 27, at A10.
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1998 session to increase penalties for racially motivated church arson and
hate crimes in general." The Governor stated that the adoption of hate
crime legislation in Kentucky was now a high priority and that he planned
to establish "lines of communications" with local, state and federal
agencies involved with combatting and reporting hate crimes throughout-
the state.45 In addition, Governor Patton formed a group of state officials
to discuss "ways to communicate with the people of Kentucky about how
we need to pull together to combat this larger problem in society of hate
crimes." In the summer of 1997, the Governor ordered a study done in
anticipation of revamping Kentucky's system of criminal justice, which
included addressing hate crimes in the Commonwealth.47 This study
resulted in proposed legislation introduced to the House Judiciary
Committee in February of 1998.48
Governor Patton's sweeping anti-crime package envisioned the
creation of new hate crime and church arson offenses to be included in the
state's penal code 9 House Bill 455 received great support. However, there
was not universal support for increasing the criminal penalties for people
convicted of hate crimes. After much debate, the House Judiciary
Committee rejected attempts to delete the section in the House bill
dealing with hate crimes." On March 2, 1998, the Kentucky House of
Representatives passed an expansive anti-crime package by a vote of
ninety-three to zero.5 The House bill was predominantly a "get tough on
crime" bill. Its major provisions practically eliminated the possibility of
" See Loftus, Kentucky's Church-A rson Response Group, supra note 40, atA8.
Shortly after the White House meeting, Governor Paul Patton was quoted as
saying, "We will be forcefully supporting [hate crime legislation at] the next
opportunity." Patton, supra note 27, at A10.
"See Patton, supra note 27, at Al0.
46Id. (quoting Governor Patton).47S ee Tom Loftus, Criminal Justice Bill Heads to House; Committee Rejects
Effort to Weaken Hate-Crime Section, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Feb.
25, 1998, at B4 [hereinafter Loftus, Criminal Justice Bill Heads to House].
48 See House Bill 455, available on LegislativeResearch Commission Webpage
(visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.lrc.state.ky.us.record/98rs/BB455.htm>.
49 See Garrett, supra note 39, at Bl.
" See Loftus, Criminal Justice Bill Heads to House, supra note 47, at B4. One
of the sponsors of House Bill 455, State Representative Mike Bowling, reportedly
stated, "As you can tell, the Bill is popular," but predicted passage on the House
floor where attempts would be made to amend the bill in many ways. Id.
"' See HouseBill 455, supra note 48.
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parole for violent criminals and increased sentences for sex offenders.
However, a portion of the House bill did provide specific penalties for hate
crime offenses. 2
House Bill 455 was adopted by the Kentucky Senate by a vote of
thirty-one to zero,' but did not escape substantial amendment. Specific
enhancement of penalties for the commission of hate crimes were entirely
eliminated. Sexual orientation was added to the list of factors protected by
hate crime legislation, while gender, age, and disability were deleted
classifications. 54
B. Overview of Pertinent Provisions of the 1998 Kentucky Hate Crimes
Act
Hate crimes, as defined by the Kentucky Hate Crimes Act, include only
those crimes listed in the Penal Code,55 which are intentionally committed
"because of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, or national origin of
another individual or group of individuals." In contrast to the ADL Model
Legislation, gender is not included as a protected classification under the
Kentucky Hate Crimes Act.57 The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999,58
approved by the United States Senate,59 adds gender, disability, and sexual
orientation to its coverage. The trend is to broaden the classifications
covered by hate crime statutes. Approximately twenty states' statutes
52 See id. See also Robert T. Garrett, 1998 Kentucky General Assembly; House
Approves Tighter Penalties for Violent Crime-Killers Would Face True Life
Sentence Under Legislation, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 3, 1998,
atAl.
1 See House Bill 455, supra note 48.
54 See H.R. 455, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998).5 See id. See also House Bill 298, available on Legislative Research Commis-
sion Webpage (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.lrc.state.ky.us.record/98rs/
HB298.htm>.
-
6 K.R.S. § 532.031(1) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998) (see supra note 4 for fall
text).
" See Anti-Defamation League, 1999 Hate Crimes Laws, ADL Approach to
Hate Crime Legislation-Text ofADL Model Legislation (visited Sept. 26, 1999)
<http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/text legis.html> [hereinafterADLModelLegis-
lation].
51 See S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999). See also H.R. 2670, 106th Cong. (1997).
59 See S. 1217, 106th Cong. (1999) (incorporating the Hate Crimes Prevention




enacted over the past several years have included gender, disability, and
sexual orientation as protected classes.'
The crimes included in the 1998 Kentucky Hate Crimes Act are
assault,6' menacing, wanton endangerment,6 2 criminal abuse,63 kidnap-
ping,6 sex offenses,65 property damage,' rioting,67 disorderly conduct,68
and harassment. 69 The Act also creates the offense of institutional
vandalism, which criminalizes damaging, defacing, or desecrating objects
that are venerated by a particular group.70 Why the punishment for hate
crimes is limited to the particular crimes outlined above is unclear. The
Kentucky Legislature could consider including all categories of crimes
within the hate crime laws.
There are no specific enhanced penalties outlined in the Act for hate
crimes. However, the Act does provide an opportunity for a judge to
exercise discretion during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, if the
judge finds that the crime was motivated primarily by the victim's race,
color, religion, sexual orientation, or national origin.
The Act provides in part:
[A]t sentencing, the sentencing judge shall determine if, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence presented at the trial a hate crime was a primary
factor in the commission of the crime by the defendant. If so, the judge
shall make a written finding of fact and enter that in the court record and
in the judgment rendered against the defendant. 71
60 SeeADL Statutory Provisions, supra note 26. It has been strongly urged that
numerous types of violent crimes against women should be classified as hate
crimes, because victims of rape and domestic violence, "like victims of other hate
crimes, are interchangeable in the eyes of their attackers." Marguerite Angelari,
Hate Crime Statutes: A Promising Tool For Fighting Violence Against Women, 2
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 63, 66 (1994) (citation omitted).
61 See K.R.S. § 532.031(l)(a) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998) (citing id. §§
508.010, 508.020, and 508.025).
62 See id. § 532.03 l(l)(b) (citing id. §§ 508.050 and 508.060).
63 See id. § 532.031(l)(c) (citing id. §§ 508.100 and 508.110).
6' See id. § 532.03 l(1)(d) (citing id. § 509.020).
65 See id. § 532.031(1)(e) (citing id §§ 510.040, 510.050, 510.060, 510.070,
510.080, 510.090,510.100, and 510.110).
6See id. § 532.031(l)(f) (citing id. §§ 512.020, 512.050, and 512.060).
67 See id. § 532.031(l)(h) (citing id. § 525.020).
68 See id. (citing id. § 525.060).
69 See id. (citing id. § 525.070).
71 See id. § 532.031.
71 Id. § 532.031(2).
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Upon finding that a hate crime is a primary factor in the commission of the
crime, the judge may use that finding as the sole factor for refusing the
defendant probation, shock probation, conditional discharge, or other
alternatives to incarceration.72 In addition, if the judge makes the written
finding that a hate crime was a primary factor in the commission of the
crime, the Parole Board may later use the finding to deny or delay parole
to a defendant?73
For the first time, victims of hate crimes in Kentucky are allowed to
seek compensation from the state.74 However, there is no provision in the
current Act for the award of civil or punitive damages. In contrast, the ADL
Model Hate Crimes Legislation allows a victim of a hate crime to pursue
a civil action and an award of special and general damages, including
damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and/or reasonable
attorney fees and costs. The burden of proof in the civil action is that of any
other civil action.75
IV. STRENGTHENING HATE CRIME LAWS IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky's current Hate Crimes Act should be viewed as merely a
beginning for future, more effective hate crime legislation. It appears that
is what the Kentucky Legislature intended. Although its enactment was not
without controversy,76 the current Act has been viewed as an acorn from
7See id. § 532.031(3).
7 See id. § 532.031(4).
See id. § 346.055.
See ADL Model Legislation, supra note 57.
76 Several issues posed obstacles to the passage of the original hate crime bill,
which contained much tougher penalties for hate crimes. See H.R. 455, Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 1998). First, there was resistance about the idea of hate crimes in general. A
debate arose in the Legislature concerning whether it should make any difference,
in imposing a criminal penalty, that a person commits a crime with a motivation
based upon hatred for a member of a protected class. If so, should separate hate
crimes be established in the Kentucky Penal Code for the commission of a bias-
motivated offense, or should the statute provide for merely penalty enhancements
for crimes that are already on the books? Second, there was some dispute over what
categories of persons should be included. For example, should gender, disability,
or age be included as a protected class under the statute? Should some rapes be
considered a hate crime? Although the final version of the Hate Crimes Act
includes sexual orientation as a hate crime category, its inclusion was met with
much controversy. It has been suggested that the original bill, with much stronger
penalties, was weakened as a compromise to include sexual orientation as a
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which a mighty oak can grow." As part of the 1998 Kentucky Hate Crimes
Act, the legislature established the Kentucky Criminal Justice Council to
conduct long-range planning and make recommendations to both the
Governor and the General Assembly on criminal justice policy and the
structure of the current system. 8 The Council's broad membership
represents the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, defense bar, prosecut-
ing bar, academia, and advocate groups in Kentucky.79 A portion of the
Council's legislative charge was to: (1) investigate the problem of gang
activity in Kentucky and (2) study the impact of the current hate crime
statute.8" The Kentucky Criminal Justice Council is working in tandem with
the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights ("KCHR"), which is
endorsing specific penalty enhancements. The KCHR is in the process of
supplying additional anecdotal information about the occurrence of hate
crime activity in Kentucky."' Such long-range planning and impact study
is a prerequisite to the passage of an effective hate crime bill in Kentucky.
Information gathered between legislative sessions 2 can form the basis for
category. See Kentucky Criminal Justice Council Law Enforcement Issues
Committee, Meeting Summary, Apr. 9, 1999, at 6 (on file with author) [hereinafter
KCJC Law Enforcement Issues CommitteeSummary].
I Kim Allen, Executive Director of the Kentucky Criminal Justice Council, has
stated that "[t]he present statute was seen as a means of getting the state's foot in
the door, by getting a hate crime statute established." KCJC Law Enforcement
Issues Committee Summary, supra note 76, at 6.
78 See H.R. 455, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998); see also K.R.S. § 15A.040 (Michie
1990 & Supp. 1998).
71 See The Activities, Findings andRecommendations ofthe Kentucky Criminal
Justice Council: An Interim Report, July 1999, at 1 [hereinafter KCJC Interim
Report] (on file with author).
80 See K.LRS. § 15A.040; see also Kentucky Criminal Justice Council Law
Enforcement Issues Committee Preliminary Report II, May 7, 1999, at 1-2 (on file
with author) [hereinafter 1999 KCJC Preliminary Report I1].
81 The KCHR is also in the process of providing training to police officers in
Kentucky concerning the reporting of hate crime activity and enforcing hate crime
laws. The United States Department of Justice has formed a joint task force in
Kentucky to devise procedures for citizens to report hate crimes. Members of the
task force are Beverly Watts, Executive Director of the KCHR4 Kim Allen,
Executive Director of the Kentucky Criminal Justice Council; and Officer Jerry
Wells, Bowling Green Police Department. See Telephone Interview with Beverly
Watts, Executive Director of the KCHR (Sept. 20, 1999).
2 See KCJC Law Enforcement Issues Committee Summary, supra note 76, at
6. Pre-filed bills are due by October 1999 for the Legislative Session scheduled to
begin in January 2000.
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much stronger hate crimes laws in Kentucky. The object of this section is
to provide additional information and a basis for strengthening the
Kentucky Hate Crimes Act.
A. Separate Bias Motivated Offenses for Hate Crimes or Specific Penalty
Enhancements for Existing Crimes Motivated By Hate Bias?
In enacting the 1998 Kentucky Hate Crimes Act, the Kentucky
Legislature had a choice between the creation of a "new crime" statute
which would criminalize separate bias motivated offenses, or the enhance-
ment of existing sentencing options for existing offenses.83 A "new crime"
statute does not refer to previously enacted sections of the criminal code or
to crimes defined elsewhere. It defines all the elements of the crime it
describes within its own terms. 84 "New crime" versions of hate crime
statutes have met with the most successful First Amendment challenges, as
they often impinge upon protected speech.85 In RA. V v. City of St. Paul,86
the United States Supreme Court warned that it would strike down any
limit upon the freedom of speech that singles out only certain types of hate
speech. For example, a state could constitutionally prohibit statements that
constitute "fighting words" in general, but could not prohibit "fighting
words" aimed at African-Americans. 7 The Supreme Court has reasoned
that such proscriptions are impermissibly content-based.8
In contrast to a "new crime" statute, a sentence enhancement statute
merely supplements previously enacted sections of the state's criminal
83 Technically, there is a third choice for legislators contemplating the enact-
ment of a hate crime statute. A civil rights model hate crime statute does not
enhance penalties for previously defined crimes. Nor does it define specific
criminal behavior as a"new crime." It broadly criminalizes any violent deprivation
of a victim's civil rights. These rights are protected under federal and state
constitutions. Civil rights model statutes are in a separate category from the
previous two choices because they usually do not define the protected classes. The
protection afforded to victims for these crimes extend to all persons, without
reference to the kind ofsocial prejudice that motivates the perpetrator. See Anthony
Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 387 (1994).
84 See id.
85 See Lori A. Spillane, Hate Crimes: Violent Intolerance, 29 PROSECUTOR 20
(1995).86R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
7 See id.
88 See id.; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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code and is purely derivative of existing criminal law. A sentence
enhancement statute may increase a sentence by a certain length of time,
or it may increase a crime up to the next level.89 For example, a sentence
enhancement statute may increase a misdemeanor to a felony or a lower
felony to a higher one. It can mandate a sentence enhancement or provide
discretion to the sentencing judge to increase a criminal penalty if it is
determined that the crime was committed with the requisite hate motiva-
tion. A sentence enhancement statute, by criminalizing hate crimes, does
not define any behavior as criminal which was not criminal prior to the
enactment of the statute.
Sentence enhancement statutes are generally upheld against constitu-
tional challenges, as they are seen as punishing the existing, underlying
criminal conduct rather than punishing protected First Amendment.
speech.90 For example, the statute upheld by the United States Supreme
Court against a First Amendment challenge in Wisconsin v. Mitchell9 was
purely a sentence enhancement statute. Rather than creating a new crime,
the statute merely increased the possible penalty for an existing crime.
Mitchell's battery conviction originally carried a maximum two year
sentence. Because the jury found that Mitchell had selected his victim on
the basis of his race, the trial judge could have increased the maximum
period of imprisonment byup to five years. He doubled Mitchell's sentence
to four years.92
The Kentucky Legislature chose to enact a weakened form of a
sentence enhancement scheme in the new Hate Crimes Act. The Legisla-
ture created neither specific and separate offenses in the Penal Code for
bias motivated crimes, nor specific enhanced penalties for existing crimes.
The Act simply gives a judge the discretion to do what was already
authorized under pre-existing law: to deny probation, shock probation,
conditional discharge, or any other form of incarceration.93 Kentucky's
statutory hate crime provisions should easily withstand any First Amend-
ment challenge made on the basis that the hate crime law seeks to punish
individuals because of their point of view. However, the current discretion-
ary scheme in Kentucky has serious flaws. First, because of their discre-
tionary nature, Kentucky's hate crime provisions may seldom be applied.
89 See Spillane, supra note 85.90 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 476.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93See K.R.S. § 532.031(3) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998).
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Second, the Act fails to provide notice to criminal defendants in Kentucky
that they may be subject to an enhanced sentence.
B. The Adoption ofNondiscretionary, Specific Penalty Enhancements for
Existing Crimes Send a Strong Message Against Hate Crimes
Currently, the commission of a hate crime in Kentucky, no matter how
heinous, does not subject the offender to a specific criminal penalty. A
sentence enhancement is totally within the sentencing judge's discretion.
In reality, the Act provides little more than the discretion a sentencing
judge already possesses in denying probation or parole due to aggravated
circumstances in the commission of the crime. 4 As it stands, Kentucky's
Hate Crimes Act has few teeth to deter or punish hate crimes committed
within the state.
This weakness in the penalty provision of the Hate Crimes Act has
been identified as a major concern. By failing to provide for specific
penalties attached to hate crime offenses, "the statute fails to provide a
clear and strong message that hate crime is unacceptable in our commu-
nity."95 Hate crime laws should seek to deter hate motivated behavior,
reassure hate victims of their value, and "symbolically heal[ ] the wounds
in the social fabric that are created by hate-motivated acts. 96
It has been argued that hate crime statutes give special rights to only
certain classes of persons, and therefore impinge upon the right to equal
protection under the law.97 However, the special rights argument against
hate crime laws is greatly undermined because penalty enhancement
statutes can be applied against members of any group.
Indeed, Wisconsin's Hate Crime Statute was constitutionally applied
to enhance the criminal penalty imposed upon Todd Mitchell, a nineteen-
year-old black male.98 Mitchell was part of a group of black males who
94 See id. § 532.031.
9 KCJC Interim Report, supra note 79, at 22.96 Shirley Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for
Hate Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 515, 524 (1994) (citation omitted).
17 See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic
Intimidations Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333,379 (1991); see also Daniel E. Troy,
Hate Crime Laws Make Some More Equal Than Others, WALL ST. 3., Oct. 19,
1998, at A27.
98 See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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nearly beat to death a fourteen-year-old white male before stealing the
British Knight sneakers from his feet. Todd Mitchell was heard to say, just
prior to the beating, "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white
people?", and "There goes a white boy, go get him!" A jury found
Mitchell, the only member of the group who was not a juvenile, guilty of
battery and theft. In addition, the jury returned a separate verdict under the
penalty enhancement statute, finding that the black nineteen-year-old,
Mitchell, had intentionally selected his victim on the basis of his white
race.
100
Opponents ofhate crime laws, and specifically ofpenalty enhancement
provisions, also argue that a crime is a crime. The law should not punish
one criminal more severely than another, simply because the first
criminal's actions were motivated by hate and bias for a particular group.
However, all crimes are not treated alike under the law. For example, the
law considers the underlying motivation for a crime in differentiating
between involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and first degree
murder. 101 The law recognizes that an assault is not always only an assault
against the direct victim and that a harsher penalty should be imposed
based upon the victim's status. For example, an assault against a police
officer is considered more heinous than an assault against a civilian, as it
represents an assault against society."2 The penalty for the crime is
enhanced because of the status of the victim, the motivation behind the
crime, and the injury to society. Similarly, a hate crime symbolizes an
attack not only on the individual, but on the larger community. It is the
unique injury to the larger community which justifies an enhanced penalty
for hate crimes and a strong message, through strong legislation, that hate
crimes will not be tolerated.
C. The Adoption ofNondiscretionary, Penalty Enhancements for Hate
Crimes Would Promote Judicial Economy and Needed Guidance to
Those Charged with Enforcing Hate Crime Laws
Under the current Kentucky Hate Crimes Act, an accused is not
initially charged or indicted with a specific hate crime. An accused may not
know that he is subject to an enhanced penalty in the form of denial of
" Id. at 809.
100 See id.
101 See Karen Samples, Should We Impose Tougher Penalties for Offenses
Against Certain Victims?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 29, 1998, at D1.
,"Seesupra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Samples, supra note 101.
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probation or parole until long after the opportunity to enter a plea or to
weigh the potential sentence has passed. The future of the accused greatly
depends upon the perceptions and inclinations of the particular judge who
presides over the trial. The Hate Crimes Act allows for consideration of the
defendant's motivation only at the sentencing stage, and merely allows for
the denial of probation or parole by the sentencing judge based upon a
preponderance of the evidence standard."3
Under the current Kentucky Hate Crimes Act, a criminal proceeding is
bifurcated. The finder of fact during the guilt or innocence phase is the
jury; at sentencing, it is the judge. 0 4 The bifurcation of the procedure and
lack of any specific penalty enhancement provisions create some difficult
problems for the criminal justice system, the accused, and the victim in
implementing the Kentucky Hate Crimes Act.
The Act presents a major hurdle in classifying any crime a hate crime.
In effect, the Act requires much duplication of effort in all criminal
proceedings and confusion in applying the burden of proof. First, the jury
makes an initial determination of guilt or innocence under a reasonable
doubt standard. Second, thejudge then must determine, by apreponderance
of the evidence, whether hate was a primary motivating factor in the
commission of the crime and if so, make a finding in the record. 105
In contrast to the guilt finding stage of a criminal proceeding, the Act
is written in nondiscretionary terms when it mandates that ajudge presiding
in a criminal proceedings "shall" make a written finding in the record as to
whether the crime was motivated by hate against one of the classified
groups." Hate-bias motivation is treated as an aggravating circumstance,
providing the sentencing judge with discretion to deny probation, parole,
or other alternatives to incarceration.0 7 The decision whether to deny
probation or parole based upon a hate-bias motivation need only be made
if there is a finding on the record that a hate crime was committed,'
creating a disincentive for application of the Kentucky Hate Crimes Act.
'
3 See K.R.S. § 532.031(2) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998).
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that the constitutional right to a
trial by jury is limited to the determination of guilt or innocence. See Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 781 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1989). Consideration of any future
consequences such as treatment, commitment, probation, shock probation, and
parole has no place in the jury's finding and may serve to distort it. See id.
'
05 See K.R.S. § 532.031(2) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998).
10 6 See id.
07 See id. § 532.031(3).
108 See id. § 532.031(2).
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Courts are unlikely to impose a sentence enhancement, or even a
prospective denial of probation or alternative incarceration for hate crimes,
without more specific statutory authority and consistent burdens of proof.
Hate crime laws must beusedby law enforcement, prosecutors,judges, and
juries if they are to have any impact.109 Hate crimes statutes must clearly
define the boundaries of the law if they are going to be imposed by those
in a position to enforce them. 10
It should be made clear to prosecutors in Kentucky pursuing enhanced
penalties against an accused that they must not only prove the elements of
the underlying crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but also the
additional element of hate-bias motivation."' Under the current Act, the
prosecution need not prove a hate-bias motivation as an element of a hate
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing judge uses a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard in deciding whether to grant or deny
probation or alternatives to incarceration."' Providing specific enhanced
penalties within the Kentucky Hate Crimes Act, rather than the present
discretion in incarceration alternatives, would clarify that motivation is an
essential element of a hate crime which must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. First, the prosecution would need to prove the underlying crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the prosecution would need to prove
the element of motivation beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find a
defendant guilty of a hate crime subject to penalty enhancement.
No evidence of expressions or associations should be introduced at trial
unless that evidence is specifically related to the crime charged. Moreover,
the Act must not be used to "investigate or punish constitutionally
protected thoughts, opinions, beliefs, expressions, or associations."' 3 For
example, the mere association of the defendant with a skinhead group
would not alone be sufficient evidence of motivation. On the other hand,
the nature of the crime, along with the defendant's statements to others,
may provide sufficient evidence of motive. For instance, the painting of a
See Spillane, supra note 85, at 24.
HO The Kentucky State Police favored the first version of the Kentucky Hate
Crimes Act, which contained specific penalty enhancement provisions by bumping
up each offense by one degree if found to be a hate crime. See KCJC Law
Enforcement Issues Committee Summary, supra note 76.
. See Karen Denton, Hate Crime Legislation: Balancing First Amendment
Concerns, ACLU REP. (Winter 1999) (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.
acluutah.org/hatecrime.htm> (citing National ACLU Guidelines).
112 See K.R.S. § 532.031(2) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998).
133 Denton, supra note 111.
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swastika on the side of a Jewish family's home is evidence of a direct
assault upon the fact that the family is Jewish and implies that the offender
engaged in the criminal conduct because of what the swastika
symbolizes. 4 Some indicators usedbyprosecutors in determining whether
a crime is bias motivated include: (1) common sense (as in the swastika
example); (2) language used by the suspect during the commission of the
crime (racial slurs, etc.); (3) the severity of the attack or mutilation of the
victim; (4) lack of provocation for the crime; (5) contact or prior history
between the victim and suspect; (6) previous history of similar incidents in
the same area; and (7) absence of any other apparent motive (e.g., battery
without a robbery)." 5
As the boundaries ofhate crime laws in Kentuckybecome more clearly
defined, there will be less resistance to them. Those charged with the
enforcement and prosecution of hate crimes will better recognize hate
crimes and fairly apply the law. In turn, well defined, specific penalties for
hate crimes "provides an impetus for law enforcement""16 and the judicial
system "to be more vigilant"" 7 in remedying the problem of hate crimes in
our society. "[N]ew methods of apprehension, more contact within the
community, and an increased sensitivity toward hate crime victims"' 8 will
develop.
D. The Adoption ofNondiscretionary Penalty Enhancement for Hate
Crimes Would Provide Notice of Criminal Penalties for Hate Crimes
to Those Accused ofHate Crimes
Hate crime statutes are vulnerable to challenges based upon the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution if they are not clearly
drafted so as to provide notice of the boundaries of the law."9 Although
enhancement statutes are constitutional on the basis that the commission
of an underlying crime is being punished rather than free speech, 2 they
"
4 See Spillane, supra note 85, at 24.
15 See id.
1 6 Id. at 25.
117Id.
I Id.
'19 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... ." See also id. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ... ."Id.
'
2 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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must also clearly define when bigoted behavior will be punished under the
law. "The due process clause requires that a criminal statute give clear
notice of what activity is proscribed and provide adequate guidelines to
prevent arbitrary law enforcement actions."''
Stiffer penalties for hate crimes "discourage potential hate crime
perpetrators from committing such crimes."'" If hate crime laws are to
have any deterrent effect, their gravity must impact behavior. Potential
offenders must have notice that Kentucky's system of justice takes hate
crimes seriously. Such notice wouldbe provided through specific sentence
enhancement provisions contained in the Kentucky Hate Crimes Act.
It is recommended that the penalty for the underlying crime be bumped
up at least one degree if it is found that the motivation for the crime was
hate-bias. If the degree of criminal liability is enhanced by simply one
degree over that imposed for the commission of the underlying offense,'
many issues of notice would be resolved. For example, a Class A misde-
meanor would be bumped up to a Class D felony if a hate crime was
committed. An indictment would be involved, giving further notice of the
enhanced sentences for a hate crime. 24
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the Kentucky Legislature should be commended for taking
a first step against hate crimes, the objectives of the 1998 hate crime
2 1 Anti-Defamation League, 1999Hate Crime Laws Constitutional Challenges
to Hate Crimes Statutes (visited Sept. 26, 1999) <http://www.adl.org/99hateerime/
constitutionality.html>.
' Spillane, supra note 85, at 25.
'z The ADL Model Hate Crime Statute recommends that the degree of criminal
liability be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for commission of
the underlying offense. It provides in part that "[a] Bias-Motivated Crime under
this code provision is a__ misdemeanor/felony (the degree of criminal liability
should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for commission of the
underlying offense)." ADL Model Legislation, supra note 57. The Wisconsin
statute upheld in Mitchell, after defining hate crimes in subsection (1), provides:
(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other
than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the
revised maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail (b)
If the crime under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the penalty
increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and
the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of
imprisonment is 2 years.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 481 n.1.
124 See 1999 KCJC Preliminary Report I1, supra note 80, at 2.
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legislation are not being met in Kentucky, perhaps because of the discre-
tionary nature of the Act's penalty enhancement provisions. A recent
survey of prosecutors in Kentucky revealed that prosecutors had little
experience with the new Hate Crimes Act.'25
Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, New Mexico, South Carolina, and
Wyoming are the only other states which have not adopted specific penalty
enhancement provisions for the commission of hate crimes. '26 It is
recommended that Kentucky join the overwhelming majority of states
which have specific penalty enhancement in their hate crime laws.
By adopting stiffer penalties for hate crimes, the Legislature will send
a strong message that hate crimes are not tolerated in Kentucky. In
clarifying the law, the Legislature will provide needed guidance to those
charged with enforcing hate crime laws. Hate crime laws will become more
effective for the benefit ofthe individual victim and victimized community.
In turn, hate crime laws will deter bias motivated crimes, as potential
perpetrators will have necessary notice of the severity of punishment.
The Legislature should make clear to those charged with a crime in
Kentucky that sentence enhancement will attach when a person commits
a crime within the statute,'27 and intentionally selects the victim or property
that is damaged in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or
perception 2 ' that the victim belonged to a particular group. 129 Specifically,
the penalty for the underlying crime should be enhanced by at least one
degree if it is determined that it constitutes a hate crime.
'25 See id.
26ee ADL Statutory Provisions, supra note 26.
127 See, for example, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.646 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997),
as well as the Anti-Defamation League Model Hate Crime Statute, which defines
"crime" by inserting existing code provisions for statutorily proscribed criminal
conduct. See ADL Model Legislation, supra note 57.
12 SeeADL ModelLegislation, supra note 57. In addition to providing specific
penalty enhancement for hate crimes, the proposed language would make two
significant changes in the current statute. First, a hate-bias motivation would no
longer have to be the primary or sole motivation for the crime, but a motivation.
Second, the actor's belief or perception is what is important; notwhether the victim
actually was a member ofaparticular group delineated in the statute. This language
is both part of the ADL Model Legislation as well as the Wisconsin hate crime
statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.
129 The ADL Model Legislation protects the following classifications: race,
color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender. See id. The
Wisconsin Statute includes race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645(1)(b) (West 1996).
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